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TORTS-MAY A COMMON CARRIER REFUSE TRANSPORTA-
TION TO A PASSENGER BELIEVING HIM TO BE DRUNK
WHEN IN FACT HE HAS NOT BEEN DRINKING AT ALL?
The case of Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Klatt,' decided by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, permitted the plaintiff to recover
damages for humiliation and injured feelings as a result of being re-
fused passage on one of the defendant's busses. The refusal was based
upon the driver's belief that the plaintiff was intoxicated. The jury
was instructed to the effect that if it found that the plaintiff was
sober or not so intoxicated as to make him an unfit passenger, it was
to find for the plaintiff. An additional instruction was given to the
effect that if the defendant reasonably believed that the plaintiff was
intoxicated so as to make him an unfit passenger, the jury should
find for the defendant.
These instructions may have been contradictory if the first
meant that if in fact the plaintiff was not intoxicated the defendant
should be liable and if the second instruction meant that if the de-
fendant reasonably believed that the plaintiff was intoxicated it
should be absolved from liability. So, the jury may have based its
decision for the plaintiff on one of two basic findings of fact:
(1) The plaintiff was not in fact drunk or not so drunk as to
make him an unfit passenger.
(2) The defendant did not have reasonable grounds to believe
that the plaintiff was so far intoxicated as to make him an unfit
passenger.
Whatever the jury's finding, upon which it based its verdict for
the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals refused to interfere with it. The
reason given was that the evidence was conflicting, justifying a sub-
mission of the case to the jury, and that, "The recovery in the case
before us does not rest upon a mere scintilla."'
In affirming this decision the court did not discuss the problem
of the right of a carrier to refuse transportation. And in this respect,
for what the case is authority is a matter of conjecture. It might be
authority for the proposition that a carrier is liable for damages re-
sulting from an unreasonable refusal of transportation. On the other
hand, the court may have laid down the proposition that if a carrier
mistakenly believes one to be in an unfit condition for transportation
300 Ky. 505, 189 S.W 2d 731 (1945)
The instructions according to the court were copied from a prior
case, Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v Gatewood, 155 Ky 102, 159
S.W 660 (1913)
Supra, note 1.
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it is liable though the belief was a reasonable one. If so, the case may
be open to severe criticism.
Whatever the case held, the factual situation involved raises an
important problem. Suppcse the belief of drunkenness, though mis-
taken. was a reasonable one? Should the carrier nevertheless be
liable if damages can be shown? If the question is answered in the
affirmative, then it may be concluded ,that if a carrier refuses trans-
portation it does so at its peril.
At common law carriers were under a general obligation to re-
ceive and carry all proper persons who presented themselves for that
purpose. and who paid or tendered a reasonable compensation for
the service. The reason for this rule was the public nature of the
employment independent of any contractual relationship.' The law
in Kentucky as established by the cases, has not deviated from this
original concept; and it has frequently been stated as being one of
the bases of the Court's decision. Quite naturally difficulty has
arisen-over the term "proper person," since, as an incident to their
general obligations to the public, common carriers have been given
the right and duty to make reasonable and proper rules for the con-
duct of their business, so that it depends largely upon the type of
carrier involved as to the interpretation given of a "proper person."
Some persons may be excluded as being "improper" by an airplane
carrier! who would not be excluded by a railroad carrier. In general,
however, a proper person may be defined as one whose appearance,
conduct, and condition apparently entitle him to be carried as a
passenger. In its appraisal of the passenger, the carrier is bound to
exercise a reasonable discretion, according to the conditions as they
appear at the time.
It is well established that a carrier is not an insurer of the pas-
senger s safety but is liable to its passengers for the negligent acts
and omissions to act on the part of its servants.' However, in proving
negligence there is involved the essential element that the carrier
or its servants had knowledge, or with proper care could have had
knowledge, that the wrong was imminent or likely to occur.9 In this
lies a basis for the right of a carrier to refuse transportation to a
person appraised to be an "improper person" according to the reason-
13 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE (1902) sec. 2541.
Reasor v Paducah & Illinois Ferry Company, 152 Ky. 220, 153
S. W 222 (1913) Bogard's Adm'r. v Illinois Central Railroad Co.,
144 Ky 649. 139 S.W 855 (1911)
SCasteel v American Airways, Inc., 261 Ky. 818, 88 S.W 2d 976
(1935)
Bogard's Adm'r. v Illinois Central Railroad Co., 144 Ky. 649, 139
S.W 855 (1911) 3 THOMPsoN, NEGLIGENCE (1902) sec. 3225.
'Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v Bell, 166 Ky. 400,
408, 179 S.W 400, 403 (1915)
'Clark's Adm'x. v Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 20 Ky. L.
Rep. 1839. 1841, 49 S.W 1120 (1899)
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able rules and regulations of the carrier. One would hardly presume
to hold a carrier liable for the acts of an "improper person" and yet
deny to it the right to reject such a person, when, by the exercise of
reasonable prudence and discretion, the person is believed to be in no
fit condition to be carried and in all probability will be guilty of
some misconduct.
In this state, not only have the rights of a carrier been strictly
defined, but the law has gone so far as to make the conductor of a
train the agent of the Commonwealth in order to afford the passen-
gers on the train protection beyond that owed by the carrier.'" By
legislative enactment, the Legislature has forbidden the drinking of
intoxicants and has also forbidden boisterous and riotous conduct
aboard common carriers while it has imposed upon the carrier the
duty of enforcing such law." By virtue of the age-old concept of a
common carrier's general duty to the traveling public, a common
carrier is not deprived of the right and opportunity to protect the
lives and general well being of its orderly passengers, and in so doing
to protect itself from liability for acts of misconduct by one passenger
against a fellow passenger.
The court in recognizing the seriousness of this problem, stated in
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Bell," with reference to
the above mentioned statutes, that, " we have given to these
sections of the statutes a liberal construction to promote the purpose
of their enactment, which was to protect well-behaved and orderly
passengers from violence, indignity or insult at the hands of other
passengers, and to place in the power of the carrier adequate means
to protect its passengers without subjecting itself to liability if it act
with reasonable prudence and discretion." It should be noted that, by
such language, the court excluded any unwarranted or arbitrary re-
fusals of passengers by carriers under a color of right.
The right of a common carrier to refuse to carry a passenger has
been upheld in cases where the person desiring transportation was-
only so intoxicated as to merely "affect his conduct,"' 3 and where the
person was intoxicated and had been guilty of misconduct on a
previous occasion." But, on the other hand, the court held in Reasor
v. Paducah & Illinots Ferry Company, " that the mere fact that a
passenger had been guilty of misconduct on a previous trip was not
sufficient ground to justify the carrier in refusing him passage, if at
" Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Pruitt, 157 Ky 133,
138, 162 S.W 781, 783 (1914).
"KY. R. S. (1946) secs. 244.020, 277.260.
"166 Ky 400, 408, 179 S.W 400, 403 (1915)
"Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Selsor, 142 Ky 163, 134 S.W
143 (1911).
" L. & N. R. R. Co. v McNally 31 Ky L. Rep. 1357, 105 S.W 124
(1907).
" 152 Ky 220, 153 S.W 222 (1913).
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the time he applied to the carrier for passage he was sober and con-
ducting himself in a decent and orderly manner.
Mention here has been made of only a few of the cases classify-
ing the so-called "improper person" as decided by the Kentucky
courts. However, the carrier's right to refuse transportation has been
further upheld where the person desirmg transportation was in the
advanced stages of tuberculosis and was adjudged by a doctor to be
too sick to travel, and where carriage of such a passenger would de-
lay the carrier and cause undue inconvenience to the other passen-
gers.'6 The rule was further applied when the passenger was a blind
man traveling without an attendant, thus depending upon chance
acquaintances or the carrier's servants for aid.'" Further still, this
right to refuse is extended to cover all persons riding for criminal
purposes,'" or anyone riding for any purpose detrimental to the in-
terests of the carrier, such as a competitor in business."
However, the specific problem to be discussed is the alleged in-
toxicated person, and the brief resume above is intended only as a
background for the consideration of this problem. On the basis of
what has been said, the general rule might be stated that a carrier
is under no duty to accept a person as a passenger who is intoxi-
cated to such an extent as to render it probable that he will be dan-
gerous or disagreeable and annoying to the other passengers. This
rule imposes upon the carrier the duty to determine whether the
applicant is a proper person to be carried. What is to be the criterion
for such a determination? In most cases the question will have to be
determined, as stated above, by the appearance, conduct, and condi-
tion of the applicant, and in occasional instances by the personal
knowledge which the servant of the carrier may have of the person.
There is little dispute that the reasons which the law recogmzes
as sufficient to justify a common carrier in refusing to receive and
carry passengers willing to pay the fare relate to the character or
condition of the proposed passenger, or to the inability of the carrier
to accommodate the person due to lack of room in the vehicle. Thus,
where the carrier, from the appearance, conduct, or condition of the
applicant has reasonable cause to believe, and in good faith does be-
lieve, that the safety or convenience of its passengers will be in-
fringed upon by a particular person who presents himself for trans-
portation if he is carried, it may refuse to accept him and is not re-
quired to wait until events have justified its belief. From this state-
'" Casteel v American Airways, Inc., 261 Ky. 818, 88 S.W 2d 976
(1935).
'"Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Allen, 121 Ky 138, 89 S.W 150
(1905).
" Thurston v Union Pacific R. R., 4 Dill. 321, Fed. Case No.
14,019 (1877)
"Barney v. The Oyster Bay and Huntington Steamboat Co., 67
N.Y. 301, 23 Am. R. 115 (1876).
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ment it can be concluded that it is not the fact of mere intoxication
that disables a person from being carried, but rather the degree of
intoxication and its effect upon the individual, and whether such
mtoxication tends to make him either dangerous or obnoxious to
the other passengers. It is believed that herein lies the solution to
the problem. It may be assumed that carriers do not make unwar-
ranted and arbitrary refusals to properly qualified passengers.
This assumption is based upon the character of the service offered
by common carriers and upon the fact that it is essential to their
business that they act at all times with reasonable prudence and
discretion. So, it may be further assumed that in any case of re-
fusal, the carrier has some grounds, however slight, for its refusal.
We have seen that mere intoxication is not necessarily the disabling
factor, but may be only one of many reasons for the applicant's
condition. It has been pointed out that a carrier must base its right
to refuse solely upon the appearance, conduct, and condition of the
applicant at the time he presents himself for transportation. The rule
in the Bogard case, says in effect that a carrier may refuse to carry
passengers whose conditions or conduct from intoxication or "other
things" is such as to make their presence on the train "dangerous"
to the lives and health of the other passengers.' The writer believes
that the law will permit a carrier to refuse to carry a passenger
whom he reasonably believes to be intoxicated and in no fit condi-
tion to be carried, although, in fact, he has not been drinking at all.
In any case of refusal, the main question is whether the refusal is
reasonable under the existing circumstances. This question is prop-
erly one for the consideration of the jury under proper instructions.
Thus this right of refusal should be subject only to a test similar to
this: If the servant of the carrier has reasonable grounds to believe,
and in good faith does believe, that the passenger is not in a fit and
proper condition to be carried, and that in all probability he will be
a source of danger either to himself or to the other passengers, or
will at least unreasonably annoy or offend them, the carrier should
be justified in refusing such a person transportation. In this test,
justice is assured by the requirements of reasonable grounds and
actions in good faith on the part of the carrier. Intoxication will only
be considered in the light of its effect upon the individual and
whether its effects were sufficient to satisfy the "reasonable grounds"
necessary under the test given above.
Carriers seek by reasonable and necessary rules and regulations,
to render service to the public more safe and efficient. To accom-
plish this they hold themselves out only as carriers of goods and per-
sons which are in a fit condition to be carried. No one would presume
to hold a carrier liable for refusing to carry a load of dynamite im-
properly packaged, so by analogy, no one should presume to hold a
-' Supra, note 6.
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carrier liable for refusing to carry a load of "dynamite" in the person
of a passenger who has reasonably been appraised to be an improper
person for carriage.
In exercising their right to refuse to carry "improper persons"
carriers are held to a greater standard of care than in exercising
their right to eject passengers. The right to eject is generally based
upon statutory grounds, and in all such cases the reason for such
ejection had already accrued. On the other hand, the right of refusal
is based on more abstract grounds, since no actual misconduct has
accrued, but merely appears imminent. Therefore, it is essential that
carriers be given a wide discretion in their enactment of reasonable
rules and regulations and the enforcement of them if the traveling
public is to be protected from humiliation, annoyance, discomfort,
and mental pain, not to mention physical injury, at the hands of the
less considerate passengers.
CHARLES A. SITHER.
